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Connecting your AWS account

AWS is Coming soon. The planned connection will use a read-only cross-account role and a customer-bound external ID. You will control the trust policy without creating an access key.

Coming soon — design preview

Microsoft Entra ID, Azure and Microsoft 365 are live today. AWS connections cannot be activated yet. This page describes the planned setup and trust model; it is not an installation guide for use today.

The setup sequence below explains what you will configure when the connection is released. It is intended for architecture planning and security assessment. No setup action is required now.

One read-only role, assumed not stored

The planned collector will read IAM users, groups, roles, policy attachments and permission boundaries. It will use a role in your AWS account to obtain temporary credentials for read-only collection. You will not create or upload a long-lived access key.

The role will have two distinct policy surfaces. Its permissions policies will define the data the collector can read. Its trust policy will define the Permafrost principal allowed to assume it, together with the required external ID condition.

This separates permission scope from trust. Your team will be able to inspect both before deployment and maintain the role through your normal infrastructure change process.

The external id, and why it blocks the confused deputy

The setup will supply an external ID bound to your Permafrost customer and AWS account. You will place that value in the trust policy. Each role-assumption request will carry the same value, and AWS will check it together with the trusted principal.

The external ID condition will distinguish your connection from requests made for another customer. Knowing the role ARN alone will not satisfy the trust policy. Permafrost will derive the ID on the server rather than accept a substituted client value.

The external ID is a trust-policy condition, not an access key or password. It will bind the request to the connection; the named principal and role permissions will still control access.

The exact read permissions requested

The planned templates will attach two AWS-managed policies to the collection role. Your security team will be able to inspect the policy ARNs and the trust document before creating the role.

  • SecurityAudit (arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/SecurityAudit) will provide security-configuration visibility, including the organization policy information available to the connected account.
  • IAMReadOnlyAccess (arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/IAMReadOnlyAccess) will provide access to IAM principals, policies and their attachments.

Collection will focus on identity and permission configuration. It will not request remediation writes. Organization-level policy visibility will be limited to the information available through the connected account’s role.

The planned analysis will distinguish known grants from uncertain effective access. An organization policy outside the collector’s visibility will not be treated as a confirmed allow.

Create the role: CloudFormation, Terraform, or by hand

Setup will offer CloudFormation and Terraform templates for a role named PermafrostReadOnly. The templates will attach the read policies and add the trusted principal and external ID condition to the role’s trust policy.

You will be able to deploy the template through your infrastructure process or create the equivalent role in the AWS console. The output will be the role ARN that identifies the account and role to connect. The ARN will be connection metadata, not a credential.

Verify by use, then connect

The final setup step will take the role ARN and attempt role assumption with the connection’s external ID. Verification will check the returned account identity and perform an iam:GetAccountSummary read before activating collection.

A failed trust check or read will leave the connection inactive. Verification will test the actual trust path rather than accept the presence of a role ARN as proof of access.

You will retain control of the role and its policies. Removing the trust relationship will prevent new role assumptions once AWS applies the change. Already issued temporary credentials will remain subject to AWS session-expiry and revocation rules.